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Trusts and Estates. Tierney v. Department of Human Services,
793 A.2d 210 (R.I. 2002). In determining an applicant's eligibility
for Medicaid, all assets held by the applicant in a joint bank ac-
count with a right of survivorship are presumed to be resources of
the applicant, even if he or she dies during the determination of
eligibility.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
On March 2, 1998, Kevin J. Tierney, along with his aunt Helen
R. Markley (plaintiffs), applied to the Rhode Island Department of
Human Services (DHS) on behalf of Kevin's mother, Mary Tierney
(Mary), seeking benefits under the Medical Assistance Program
(Medicaid) to finance Mary's nursing home care.' According to
DHS policy, Mary would be eligible for Medicaid benefits only if
her assets did not exceed $4,000.2 DHS determined that Mary
held $27,108.24 in various joint bank accounts with the plaintiffs. 3
The plaintiffs did, however, retain a right of survivorship in the
event of Mary's death. 4 According to DHS policy, "all of the funds
are presumed to be the resources of the applicant" whenever the
applicant is a joint account owner.5 Finding that the plaintiffs had
only been added to the bank account for convenience purposes,
DHS denied the claim.6
On June 24, 1998, plaintiffs appeared before a DHS hearing
officer to appeal this decision. 7 At the hearing, plaintiffs acknowl-
edged the money in the account originally belonged to Mary.8
1. Tierney v. Dep't of Human Servs., 793 A.2d 210, 211 (R.I. 2002).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 211 n.1 ("Whenever the applicant is a joint account holder who has
unrestricted access to the funds in the account, ALL of the funds are PRESUMED
to be the resources of the applicant or deemor. The applicant or deemor will be
offered the opportunity to submit evidence in rebuttal of this presumption. A suc-
cessful rebuttal will result in finding that the funds (or a portion of the funds) in
the joint account are not owned by the applicant or the deemor and, therefore, are
not the resources of the applicant." (quoting R.I. DEP'T OF HUMAN SERVS. MANUAL
R. 0382.15.10.10 (emphasis omitted))).
6. Tierney, 793 A.2d at 211.
7. Id. at 211-12.
8. Id. at 212.
SURVEY SECTION
Prior to the hearing officer issuing his decision, Mary Tierney died
on August 3, 1998.9
On August 6, 1998, the DHS officer affirmed the denial of the
plaintiffs' claim, concluding Mary was the source of the funds in
the joint bank accounts and that she had unrestricted access to
these accounts during her lifetime.' 0 Therefore, the plaintiffs
failed to rebut the presumption that the funds were "the resources
of the applicant."" Furthermore, the hearing officer stated that
Robinson v. Delfino12 was not relevant to any determination of a
deceased's assets pertaining to her eligibility for Medicaid, because
such a determination only pertained to applicant's assets while
alive, rather than after death.13
On the plaintiffs' appeal, the superior court disagreed, stating
that Robinson mandated a finding that funds in the joint bank ac-
counts were the property of the plaintiffs and could not be consid-
ered by DHS in determining Mary's eligibility for Medicaid. 14
DHS appealed this decision to the Rhode Island Supreme Court.
BACKGROUND
In an appeal from the decision of a state agency, the supreme
court may concern itself only with errors of law15 and may not sub-
stitute its own judgment for the agency's findings of fact. 16
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
On appeal, the plaintiffs advanced two arguments in support
of a finding that the DHS hearing officer erred in denying their
claim for Medicaid funds for Mary Tierney: (1) under Robinson, the
9. Id. at 211.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. 710 A.2d 154 (R.I. 1998). The rule of law established in Robinson is:
[Albsent evidence of fraud, undue influence, duress, or lack of mental ca-
pacity, the establishment of a joint bank account with survivorship rights
"is conclusive evidence of the intention to transfer to the survivor an im-
mediate, in praesenti, joint beneficial possessory ownership right in the
balance of the account remaining after the death of the depositor."
Tierney, 793 A.2d. at 213 (quoting Robinson, 710 A.2d at 161 (emphasis added)).
13. Tierney, 793 A.2d at 212.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 212 (citing Star Enter. v. Delbarone, 746 A.2d 692, 695 (R.I. 2000)).
16. Id. at 213 (citing Technic Inc. v. R.I. Dep't of Employment and Training,
669 A.2d 1156, 1158 (R.I. 1996)).
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fact that Mary died prior to the hearing officer's ruling dictated the
funds were now the property of the plaintiffs, and therefore should
not have been included in a determination of eligibility for Medi-
caid funds and (2) the initial finding by the DHS hearing officer
that the plaintiffs were added to the bank accounts for convenience
purposes was erroneous. 17 Because neither assertion is relevant to
the DHS determination of Mary Tierney's eligibility for Medicaid,
the superior court erred in finding for the plaintiffs.'
First, the rule expounded in Robinson does not change DHS
policy, because while that case is controlling on ownership issues
after death, a DHS determination of eligibility for Medicaid per-
tains to the applicant's assets prior to death. 19 Therefore, Robin-
son has no bearing on any determination of Mary Tierney's assets
during her life.20 In contrast, the Rhode Island Supreme Court in
Mitchell v. Mitchell2' held that a joint bank account creates imme-
diate possessory interests during the lives of both owners. 22 Ulti-
mately, DHS should have considered the assets contained in the
joint bank accounts in determining Mary's eligibility for Medicaid
because any determination of her assets pertained only to the time
period in which she was alive. 23 Therefore, the trial justice com-
mitted reversible error in overturning the DHS decision denying
the plaintiffs' claim. 24
Second, the assertion regarding plaintiffs being added to
Mary's accounts for mere convenience was both not relevant to the
issue at hand and a non-reviewable finding of fact by the agency. 25
The assertion was not relevant because DHS had to determine
whether Mary had unrestricted access to the account, not the na-
ture of the plaintiffs' access. 26 Also, because the conclusion Mary
had unrestricted access to the accounts was a finding of fact by
DHS, any finding to the contrary by the court would violate the
standard of review.27
17. Id.
18. Id. at 214.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. 756 A.2d 179 (R.I. 2000).
22. Tierney, 793 A.2d. at 213 (quoting Mitchell, 756 A.2d at 182).
23. Id.
24. Id. at 214.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
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CONCLUSION
In Tierney v. Department of Human Services, the Rhode Island
Supreme Court reversed the ruling of the superior court that held
Robinson changed DHS policy regarding the determination of as-
sets for Medicaid eligibility. The court upheld the policy of DHS,
which mandates that assets held in a joint bank account with a
right of survivorship will be presumed to be the property of the
applicant. To rebut this presumption, the applicant must prove he
or she does not have unrestricted access to the account. The death
of the applicant during the determination of eligibility is also not
relevant to this presumption.
Kyle Zambarano
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Trusts and Estates. Tinney v. Tinney, 799 A.2d 235 (R.I. 2002).
The inheritance rights of a person adopted as an adult are the
same as those of a person adopted as a child under section 15-7-
16(a) of the Rhode Island General Laws.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
In 1990, eighty-four-year-old Ruth Tinney (Ruth) adopted
thirty-eight-year-old Kevin Tinney, a.k.a. Kevin Jacob Koelisch
(Kevin).' Thereafter, when Ruth died intestate in December 1995,
Kevin filed a petition to probate her estate, listing himself and her
biological son, Donald Tinney (Donald), as heirs at law with a one-
half ownership interest each. 2 In disagreement, Donald sought a
declaratory judgment that Kevin, as an adopted adult, was not en-
titled to intestate inheritance. 3 Donald named Kevin and the ad-
ministrator of Ruth's estate, B. Mitchell Simpson, as defendants. 4
Donald contended that section 15-7-16(a) of the Rhode Island Gen-
eral Laws, which grants a lawfully adopted child inheritance
rights equal to those of a child born to the parent, did not apply to
persons adopted as adults.5 The superior court hearing justice
granted summary judgment in favor of Kevin, concluding that the
statute applied to an adopted child regardless of age at adoption. 6
Donald timely appealed. 7
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
At issue was the intended meaning of the statute providing for
inheritance by adopted children, which states in relevant part: "A
child lawfully adopted shall be deemed for the purpose of inheri-
tance by the child and his or her descendants from the parents by
adoption.., the child of the parents by adoption the same as if he
or she had been born to them in lawful wedlock."8
Affirming the summary judgment order, the Rhode Island Su-
preme Court dismissed the plaintiffs contention that use of the
1. Tinney v. Tinney, 799 A.2d 235, 235 (R. 2002).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 235-36 (citing R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-7-16(a) (2000)).
6. Id. at 236.
7. Id.
8. Id. (quoting R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-7-16(a) (2000)).
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word "child" in section 15-7-16(a) indicated a legislative intent to
omit such adult adoptees from the operation of the statute.9
Rather, the court explained that when the language of a statute is
clear and unambiguous, legislative intent can be determined by
giving the words their plain and ordinary meaning and "child"
means the son or daughter of a parent, regardless of age.10
The plaintiffs attempt to illustrate ambiguity in the term
"child" by analogy to section 15-7-4(d), the statute permitting the
adoption of adults in which the term "persons" is used, was de-
feated by a historical analysis of the reasons for differing proce-
dures.'1 The court explained that historically juvenile court had
jurisdiction over the adoption of minors and probate court had ju-
risdiction over the adoption of adults. 12 When the family court re-
placed the juvenile court, jurisdiction over the adoption of minors
was transferred to the family court, but jurisdiction over the adop-
tion of adults remained in probate court.' 3 Furthermore, the su-
preme court explained that despite the jurisdictional difference,
the legislature at no time distinguished between the rights of those
adopted as minors and those adopted as adults.' 4 The court also
explained that this interpretation was consistent with the public
policy purpose of the statutorily created adoption relationship,
which is to promote family unity. 15
CONCLUSION
Since the language of section 15-7-16(a) is clear and unambig-
uous, the term "child" means a son or daughter of a parent, regard-
less of age. Therefore, all adoptees have the same inheritance
rights whether they were adopted before or after they reached the
age of majority.
Johnna Tierney
9. Id.
10. Id. at 237.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
